Active CSS Schemes
133
Centrally Sponsored Schemes as of FY 2024–25
Budget Concentration
91%
of CSS outlay goes to just 15 schemes
Rationalisation Attempts
3 times
2001, 2013, 2016 — count crept back each time
Avg Remaining Scheme
₹268 Cr
per year for the 115 smaller schemes (national)
Worst State Utilisation
58%
Jharkhand CSS utilisation · FY 2023–24
15 schemes, 91% of the money
CSS outlay by scheme · FY 2024–25 · ₹ crore · all 115 other schemes are grouped at the bottom
ℹ
How to read this: Each bar is one scheme's annual budget. The grey bar at the bottom shows the combined budget for ALL other 115 schemes. Notice it's smaller than MGNREGS alone.
The rationalisation that never sticks
Number of active Centrally Sponsored Schemes · 2001 to 2024–25
ℹ
How to read this: Every time the government cuts schemes, the number bounces back. The 2016 exercise cut from 147 to 66 — the green bar. By 2024 the count was back to 133.
Key Insight
The 2016 rationalisation cut schemes from 147 to 66 — celebrated as a structural reform. Within 8 years, the count rose to 133: almost back to the pre-reform level. New schemes are added through budget announcements as political signals, while old schemes are never retired based on performance. The government has no statutory mechanism to sunset schemes that fail evaluation.
The states that need schemes most use them least
Average CSS fund utilisation · FY 2023–24 · higher is better
ℹ
How to read this: % of CSS money transferred to states that was actually spent. States at the bottom consistently return funds unspent due to limited administrative capacity.
Multiple schemes, same job: agriculture sector
Active CSS schemes in agriculture · annual budgets · FY 2024–25
ℹ
How to read this: All 6 schemes address farm income, crop risk, or soil health — overlapping mandates. A farmer in Bihar may be eligible for all 6, but district offices manage separate paperwork for each.
Case Studies
The cost of too many schemes, too few hands
Behind the budget numbers are concrete failures: rationalised scheme counts bouncing back, district offices paralysed by competing reporting requirements, achievement figures double-counted across databases, and two central programmes competing for the same rural labour pool.
Rationalisation Failure · 2016–2024
The government cut 147 schemes to 66 in 2016. By 2024 the count was back to 133.
In 2015–16, the Finance Ministry pruned CSS from 147 to 66, collapsing overlapping schemes under umbrella heads. By FY 2020–21, the count had risen to 116. By FY 2024–25, it reached 133. New schemes are added with each budget — to announce policy priorities, satisfy coalition partners, or respond to crises — without removing old ones whose mandates overlap. No scheme has ever been retired based on performance evaluation alone.
Source: NIPFP Working Paper — "Centrally Sponsored Schemes: Past Trends and Way Forward" (2021); Union Budget documents
Capacity Mismatch · Bihar, Jharkhand
The district agriculture office in Gaya handles paperwork for 18 CSS sub-schemes simultaneously
District-level staff — block development officers, agriculture extension workers — are the common resource shared across all CSS schemes. In Gaya, Bihar, a single office handles 6 overlapping agriculture sub-schemes, each with separate reporting formats, separate fund flows, and separate monitoring portals. Staff spend more time filing MIS reports than providing field support. Bihar's agriculture sector utilisation rate clusters around 55–65% every year — not because the need isn't there, but because the pipeline is clogged.
Source: NITI Aayog DMEO reports; Bihar state budget reviews
Double Counting · NIPFP 2021
At least 28 CSS schemes report achievements that are also counted by other schemes
A 2021 NIPFP analysis found 28 CSS schemes where output indicators overlap with at least one other scheme. The clearest example: houses built under PM Awas Yojana Rural and Urban are counted separately, but in peri-urban areas the same dwelling is sometimes reported under both schemes. This inflates national achievement figures and makes independent outcome auditing impossible.
Source: NIPFP Working Paper No. 346/2021 — "CSS Rationalisation: Issues and Way Forward"
Implementation Paradox · MGNREGS vs PMGSY
Two central schemes competing for the same labour in the same village
MGNREGS guarantees 100 days of employment at minimum wage on local public works. PMGSY (rural roads) hires private contractors. In several states, PMGSY contractors report difficulty hiring labour because MGNREGS wage rates are comparable. During 2021–22, both schemes injected large sums simultaneously into rural Bihar and UP, causing local wage inflation that raised construction costs for PMGSY and reduced MGNREGS work-completion rates. The two schemes, designed by different ministries, were never co-ordinated.
Source: Ministry of Rural Development Annual Report; CAG Performance Audit on PMGSY (2022); NIPFP analysis